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Abstract 
This paper examines mark-up and productivity of retail trade industries under imperfect 
competition. Applying a newly developed approach by Martin (2010) to Japanese retail 
trade firm data, we estimate the firm-specific mark-up and productivity without price 
information and discuss their dispersion. Our results reveal that some assumptions 
largely used in productivity analysis such as constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition possibly bias estimates of productivity. Higher mark-up do not always 
mean higher productivity while firms with lower mark-ups are less productive. Relative 
levels of firm-specific mark-up and productivity are persistent. The performance of 
mark-up and productivity are heterogeneous across various retail trade industries. 
Among them, food retailers have both lower market power and lower productivity. 
Furthermore, regression results indicate that effects of deterministic factors on mark-ups 
do not coincide with those of productivity. It implies that competition-friendly policies 
possibly lead to unsuccessful results where firms pursue profit maximisation by 
pursuing pricing power rather than by raising productivity. Ignoring market power may 
produce misunderstandings concerning how various factors affect productivity and may 
thus lead to misleading policy implications. 
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1.  Introduction 
Although many economists and policymakers share the recognition that 
productivity growth in service industries is crucial for further long-lived development, 
academic knowledge on this issue is insufficient. This is partly because data availability 
and reliability are poor, and also partly because the theoretical and methodological 
models remain problematic. As a result, empirical results and their policy implications 
are somewhat controversial and further research to fill these gaps is necessary. This 
paper is dedicated to that research. For the Japanese retail trade industries, we estimate 
firm specific mark-up and productivity between 1995 and 2005, and discuss their 
dispersion. 
Discussions on service productivity address the following three mutually related 
issues: measurement, cause, and consequence
1. Among these, the issue of measurement 
simply means that it is difficult to precisely measure the amount of service production 
although productivity is defined as output over the weighted sum of inputs
2. In many 
empirical papers, the total sales or the value added is used as output. This approach is 
justifiable if and only if the market is perfectly competitive, and the production function 
has constant returns to scale (CRS). Under the assumption of perfect competition, the 
price equals the identical marginal cost for all firms and total sales do not include 
mark-up effects. The effects of returns to scale are excluded by the CRS assumption as 
well. However, the validity of these assumptions is really controversial. In fact, firms 
produce differentiated products and services reflecting consumers’ preferences in 
                                                  
1 Kato  (2007) 
2  In this paper, we assume that the markets of inputs are perfectly competitive since 
Eslava et al. (2005) reveals that ignoring input prices gives little effects on TFP 
estimates using Columbian data. imperfectly competitive market where mark-ups significantly affect total sales and value 
added. In addition, the existence of major firms in many service industries suggests that 
returns to scale is possibly increasing rather than constant even in service industries. 
Therefore, it is important to apply alternative approaches that relax these assumptions 
and compare their results from those of the standard approaches. As those alternatives, 
Melitz (2000), Loecker (2007), and Martin (2008) develop approaches which 
incorporate the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition into productivity 
estimation. For service sectors, Kato (2009) applies the Melitz approach to the Japanese 
large scale retail trade firms, and find positive effects of service differentiation and 
increasing returns to scale. 
As for the second issue, many papers have paid attention to increase in service 
productivity in the U.S. since the late 1990s. They compare it to stagnation in other 
advanced economies, particularly Japan, and discuss what account for these different 
performances, referring to productivity analysis of manufacturing industries. The 
following factors and conditions are examined: the roles of entry/exit effects, labour 
market flexibility, regulatory reforms, R&D, and the information and communication 
technologies (ICTs). Among these, entry/exit effects are sometimes discussed together 
with financing
3. Problems of labour market flexibility are associated with issues of the 
employment structure. Regulatory reforms and ICTs are usually thought of as the main 
engines for recent service productivity growth while the role of R&D is still 
controversial. In addition to these, the accumulation of intangible assets is also 
examined
4. These papers have contributed significantly to devising economic and 
industrial policies. On the other hand, the measurement problems still exist even in 
                                                  
3  Caballero et al. (2008) 
4  Bloom and van Reenen (2007), and Miyagawa et al. (2010) these papers. Therefore, it seems to be meaningful to carry out the robustness test for 
the above results by estimating productivity using alternative approaches. 
The third issue covers the macroeconomic effects of service sector expansion. 
Following the seminal paper by Baumol (1967), many economists have studied if the 
expansion of the service sector lowers macroeconomic productivity growth. This effect 
is called Baumal’s disease, and Nordhaus (2008) found that the U.S. economy 
experienced it in the second half of the twentieth century. Recently, Triplett and 
Bosworth (2003) assert that it was already cured in the U.S. because of the ICT 
revolution. On the other hand, Hartwig (2006) refutes it because he found that only the 
wholesale and retail trade industries raised their productivity growth even in that period. 
These papers indicate that empirical results on this issue are still ambiguous, and we 
need further development both theoretical and methodological research, in order to 
obtain more reliable perspective.   
In this paper, we focus on the first and the second issues. For the first issue, we use 
an estimation approach proposed by Martin (2010) as an alternative. Unlike other 
approaches which assume monopolistic competition or perfect competition, this 
approach does not rely on the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution, and 
simultaneously estimate the firm-specific mark-up and productivity under various forms 
of imperfect competition
5. It means that we can examine both market power and the 
productivity of firms at the same time since the firm- specific mark-up represents the 
price making power of firm in the market
6. Comparing the estimates from those of the 
standard approach, we shed light on the first issue. In addition, dynamics of firm 
performance and market structure is also examined.   
                                                  
5  Klette (1999) also allows firm-specific mark-up in productivity estimation.   
6  In this paper, the term, market power is equivalent to mark-up.   The second issue is examined by descriptive and regression analysis. Following 
Morikawa (2007), we examine some variables which represent characteristics and 
strategies of firms. For foreign capital and outsourcing, we rely on a descriptive analysis 
rather than regression because they have many zero records and blanks. Through this 
analysis, we discuss what variables are decisive for firms’ market power and 
productivity. These analyses provide some contributions to further understandings of 
service productivity dynamics and devising of more reliable industrial policies. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly explain the model 
and estimation method which we apply. In Section 3, we describe the data used. In 
Section 4, we discuss the empirical results and their implications. In Section 5, we 
conclude.   
 
2.  Estimation Method 
2-1. Definition of Service Production 
Before discussing the methodology which we use, we have to make clear the 
definition of service production and problems in estimating productivity. In existing 
research on service productivity, the definition of service production is not always 
explained, and it sometimes confuses us about what we estimate and discuss in those 
papers. In this work, we define service production as follows. Service production is the 
activities which experts provide consumers with contentment and convenience by doing 
something on behalf of consumers themselves. Theoretically, consumers can do what 
experts do by themselves although consumers’ own activities do not always provide a 
sense of contentedness or are not efficient. In this definition, output is obtained as the 
sum of consumers’ contentment and opportunity costs, and is uncountable. In actual empirics, total sales or value added is usually available. Since these variables are 
defined as  price output   and  te intermedia price output   , we need price 
information but it is not available, either. It means that it is difficult to directly estimate 
productivity using available data, and some econometric methods seem to be useful. 
For that purpose, Martin (2010) proposed a control function approach. This 
approach has the following advantages. First, it does not rely on the CRS assumption. 
Secondly, it does not assume a constant elasticity of substitution. So, it can estimate the 
firm-specific mark-up as well as productivity. Using these estimates, we examine 
dynamics of market structure and productivity. Thirdly our estimates are not affected by 
deflators because this approach uses the deviations from the median for all variables. 
Since the validity of deflators is somewhat controversial, it seems to be a reasonable 
idea to obtain the robust estimates. On the other hand, the estimation process is 
relatively complicated. 
 
2-2. Model and Estimation Method 
Following Martin (2010), we briefly explain the mode and the estimation method. 
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where  i Q ,  i A ,  i X  are quantity of output, Hicks-Neutral technology, a vector of 
inputs, respectively.     is the degree of returns to scale and 
7 0   . Applying the mean 
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where lowercase means log deviation of each variable from the median 
firm( * ln ln Q Q q i i   : * denotes the median firm)
8. 
Secondly, the utility of a representative consumer is denoted as the following 
differentiable non-convex function, 
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 is a m1 vector of quality evaluated units ( i Q
~
) of the consumed products, 
and  Y is income
9.  i Q
~
 = i iQ   (the product of consumer’s valuation of the quality and 
the quantity for firm  i’s product). Suppose each firm faces downward sloping demand 
curves conditional on actions of other firms, then the demand function is written as 
follows, 
 
 i i P D Q     ( 4 )
10. 
                                                  
8  In this paper, the median firm is selected based on the revenue per unit labour 
(man-hour).  
9  m   is the number of differentiated products. 
10  Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)  




















Thirdly, firm  i’s profit ( i  ) is written as follows, 
 
   i i i i i i C Q Q P           (5), 
 
where   i i C   is the cost function of firm  i. Since we assume all firms follow the 
profit maximisation principle, the following first order condition is obtained, 
 












Q P   










   (6). 
 
Using   X i Xi W C   ( X W  is the marginal cost of  X ) and  i  , equation (6) is 
rewritten as follows, 
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where  Xi s   represents the revenue share of variable X for firm  i. Equation (8) indicates 
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On the other hand, firm  i’s revenue ( i i i P Q R   ) is determined by production 
and demand, and is represented as a function of them,    i i i i A R R , ,    . Applying 
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 .  i    is an iid shock.   
Among the input variables, capital (k ) is usually assumed to be fixed at least in the 







































 is satisfied because the demand function    D  is monotone in 
price and  i    is consumption-augmenting. From these relations as well as the relations, 








  , the revenue function is re-written 
as follows
11,  
                                                  
11  Klette (1999) and Martin (2008)  
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In equation (11), the firm specific quality adjusted productivity (  i i i a     ) is 
assumed to follow a Markov process. Using a control function approach,  i   and  i   
are estimated as follows, 
 




                                                     ( 1 3 ) ,  
 
where    denotes the net revenue. As follows Martin (2008) and other proxy variable 
approaches such as Olley & Pakes, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Bond and Söderbom 
(2005), and Ackerberg et al. (2006),     is assumed to follow a Markov process. That is, 
 it it it it g         1 1, , and   is productivity at the threshold level for surviving. 
Following the above proxy variable approaches, exit of firms is controlled by a probit 
regression,  
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where    r   is an unknown function and approximated by a polynomial. Using a 
number of moment conditions, this approach successfully recover an estimate of   
over   ,  
 















    ( 1 6 )                                    
 
where  rit  ˆ  is an estimate of    r   obtained in the second stage of equation (16). The 
denominator of the first term in the right hand side is obtained as follows, 
 
     
            0 0 0 0 ln ln
2
, , ln , ln x it xit x xit it s s s s g

    ( 1 7 )  
 
The estimates of    rescaled by   are also used to recover  it  , using the following 
equation,  
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where  it P ˆ  is the predicted exit probability which is estimated at the first stage of this estimation procedure. Since the shock,  it   is independent of all predetermined 
variables including capital, we can use the following moment restrictions to estimate 
remaining parameters, 
 
          0 1     it it it v k X E             ( 1 9 ) .  
 
3.  Data 
In this work, we construct the dataset based upon the Basic Survey of Business 
Structure and Activity (BSBSA) for the period between 1995 and 2005
1213. This is a 
complete enumeration for firms whose workers are more than 50 or capital is over 30 
million Japanese yen in manufacturing and various service industries. As Kiyota and 
Matsuura (2004) discuss, these statistics cover many activities of firms and are 
considered reliable. From these statistics, we use total sales as data of total revenues of 
firms. The proxy of accumulated capital is the value of the tangible fixed assets. Labour 
input is calculated as man-hours
14. Following Morikawa (2010), we construct data of 
regular and contingent workers respectively and sum them up. In addition, the total 
wage is used as the labour cost. As a proxy of intermediate input, the amount of 
purchase is used in many existing papers. However, we do not follow them because that 
data includes many zeros and missing values. Therefore, instead of it, we construct that 
variable using financial data following Tokui, Inui and Kim (2007) and Kim, Kwon and 
Fukao (2007). In their papers, the intermediate input is calculated as follows,   
                                                  
12  This statistics is annually compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) Japan. 
13  We construct a panel data between 1995 and 2006, but data of the last year is only 
used for controlling exit of firms. 
14  The data of working hours are available from Monthly Labour Survey.  
  D T Dep TW SGA COGS Input te Intermedia &        (20) 
 
where COGS, SGA, TW, Dep and T&D are the cost of goods sold, the selling and 
general administrative expenses, the total wages, the depreciation and the tax and dues, 
respectively. In constructing our dataset, we rule out the firms which report zero or 
negative values as the number of regular workers, the tangible fixed assets, total wage, 
or intermediate inputs. In many existing papers, capital stock data are constructed by 
subtracting the land from the tangible fixed assets. However we do not follow them 
because we consider the location of (or access to) business possibly has a crucial role in 
production, and the land value can capture such information. In addition to these data 
for estimating mark-up and productivity, we also obtain data for firm characteristics 
from the same source (see Appendix 1). 
     
4.  Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss empirical results and interpretation of them. The 
questions examined are as follows.   
1)  Is the expected bias in the estimated TFP by the standard factor share approach 
really problematic? 
2)  Is there any correlation between mark-up and productivity? 
3)  Is the mark-up or productivity gap persistent? 
4)  What features can we find in mark-up and productivity dynamics of various retail 
trade industries? 
5)  What factors are significant to explain differences of mark-up and productivity across firms? 
The former four questions are examined by descriptive analysis, and the last one is 
basically analysed by regression analysis.   
    In order to answer to question one, we make clear what the standard factor share 
approach estimates under the condition of imperfect competition and non-CRS first. 
From equation (11), it is denoted as follows, 
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1     ( 2 1 ) .  
 
It is obvious that  it it TFPS     if and only if   ,  i  , and  i    are 1, 1, 0. Unfortunately, 
we can not directly compare it from our estimate   it TFPV  because our estimation 
approach do not obtain the estimates of   and  i  . Instead, we assume  0  i  , and 
, 67 . 1 , 33 , 1 , 00 . 1   and  00 . 2 , and compare these estimates for each case
15. Figure 1-1 
shows the kernel density of estimated productivities by the standard and our current 
approaches. It reveals that the bias is not negligible even under the assumption that there 
is no measurement error. The standard approach seems to exaggerate its productivity 
dispersion than the current one as    increases.  
On the other hand, this bias is not very problematic if it does not affect the relative 
positions of firms in their productivity distribution. To examine it, we draw a scatter 
diagram of them as Figure 1-2 and test their correlation coefficient. The figure shows 
that there are positive linear correlations between them. The correlation coefficients (= 
0.1692, 0.6831, 0.6110 and 0.5867 respectively) are not low, if  0  i  . These findings 
                                                  
15  Fox (2005) indicates that the service sector also follow increasing returns to scale. indicate that the productivity estimates of the standard approach are biased but still 
reliable to some extent if there is no measurement error. However, it is difficult to 
believe that there is no measurement error in the large scale micro data while it is 
reasonable to assume that  0  i E  . It implies that productivity estimates of the 
standard approach are not much reliable under imperfect competition and the policy 
implications of them are somewhat controversial while the estimate of aggregate 
productivity is more reliable.   
    The second question examines the relationship between market power and 
productivity of firms. Since market power through price-making gives huge effects on 
firms’ performance, examining this relationship is important for further understanding 
market structure and devising industrial policies. Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 are the scatter 
diagrams of those estimates. Interestingly, for all forms of retail trade industries, the 
diagrams look similar to some extent. They reveal that firms with lower market power 
have lower productivity although the productivity levels of firms are diversified as the 
mark-up levels appreciate. It implies that a severe discounting battle does not result 
from productivity growth. Rather it looks like a war of attrition between less productive 
firms. It is difficult to expect that such a war of attrition provides some positive 
contributions to productivity growth in the long-run. On the other hand, for majority of 
firms, their market powers have no clear or slightly negative correlation with their 
productivity. It indicates that intensive competition in retail trade industries seems to be 
positively correlated with higher productivity but it is no so much as our expectation 
from theoretical implications. In order to efficiently lead competition-friendly industrial 
policies to greater achievement in productivity growth, our findings suggest that 
additional policy supports are required. This issue is further discussed later.     The third question  discusses the metabolism of this industry. We expect that many 
firms move from the lower to higher (higher to lower) positions in terms of relative 
productivity if the market is Schumpeterian-innovative. To examine it, we write 
transition matrices of firms. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 are transition matrices in the latter half 
of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, respectively. They reveal that transition 
probabilities on the diagonal are much larger than those off the diagonal. In particular, 
the top and bottom edges are relatively larger than the middle. In addition neither a 
leapfrogging nor a free fall of relative productivity is frequent. These findings indicate 
that the relative levels of firm-specific productivity are persistent, and the retail trade 
industry is not Schumpeterian-innovative.   
    For comparison, we also write transition matrices in terms of the firm-specific 
market power as Tables 1-3 and 1-4. These tables show quite similar pictures to those of 
productivity. It indicates that the relative positions of the firm-specific market powers 
are also really persistent. For this finding, we have the following two possible 
interpretations. One of them is that consumers’ valuation for differentiated services is 
persistent. In this case, firms are likely to keep their reputation in the next year once 
they obtained. Or once firms joined discounting battles, it is difficult to get out of them. 
Another possible interpretation of this finding is that some regulations form these gaps 
of market powers. Further discussion about it is out of the scope of this paper because 
additional information about the regulations is not available in our data. However, this 
discussion shows the necessity of an analysis in terms of firm-specific market powers in 
a study of the reasonable regulations.   
    For the above three questions, we examine them as issues of all retail trade 
industries. However, the retail trade industries cover from daily commodities to long-lived durable goods, and their dynamics of productivity and market power may be 
significantly heterogeneous. Therefore, we discuss the left two questions as issues of 
each group of retail trade industries
16. To discuss question four, we plot weighted means 
of industrial productivities and mark-ups, respectively. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show them. 
These figures reveal that relative dynamics of mark-up and productivity are really 
heterogeneous across industrial groups even within the retail trade industry. For each 
group, food retailers experience the lower mark-ups and productivities at the same time. 
It means that their discounting battles neither help nor result from productivity growth.   
Since their share in the retail trade industry is largest in terms of both sales and labours 
(see Appendix2), this finding imply that they largely account for the war of attrition 
which we discuss before. On the other hand, the retailers of automobiles achieve 
relatively higher productivity levels while their mark-ups are lower. It indicates that the 
demand side conditions affect those firm performances. For this industry, it is thought 
that the fact that small and reasonably priced cars were well sold in the examined period 
partly explain this finding. Among other groups, retailers of electric equipments obtain 
an interesting result. Their productivity levels are relatively lower through the examined 
period while the mark-up levels are higher. This finding seems not to be consistent with 
our intuitive impression that we observe severe discounting battles of home electronics 
at a glance. However, it possibly happens if prices of agricultural or heavy equipments 
other than home electronics are set higher or retailers of newly developed electric 
equipments have a bargaining power in pricing to some extent. The dynamics of 
mark-up in cloth retailers is also remarkable. We observe appreciation of their mark-up 
levels for the first half of the 2000s while productivity is still relatively lower. The 
                                                  
16  We follow JSIC three digit classification (revised in 2002) timing of this mark-up appreciation gives us a guess that the regulatory reform for the 
location of the large scale stores including complex shopping malls partly forms it. To 
discuss them further, we need details of these industries and regulations although those 
data are not usually available. However, our findings at least indicate that the demand 
side conditions as well as the supply side ones should be well considered in devising 
effective industrial policies to support productivity growth.   
      To answer question five, we carry out regression analysis for both mark-up and 
productivity estimates. Following Morikawa and other previous research, we examine 
the following variables (details of them are in Appendix 1): SCALE (business scale), 
LABOUR (firm size), AGE (firm age), PROFIT (profitability), CASHFLOW 
(sales-cashflow ratio), EFFICIENT (efficiency of business), FOREIGNK (ratio of 
foreign captal), OUTSOURCE (ratio of outsourcing), PART (part-time ratio), WAGE 
(average quality of workers), DIFFERENT (index of service differentiation), INFO 
(index of information use), DIVERGE ( index of diversification), ESTABLISH (index 
of market saturation strategy), and SELFK (ratio of self capital). Among these variables, 
FOREIGNK and OUTSOURCE are examined by a descriptive analysis because many 
firms record zeros or blanks for them. These variables are classified into the following 
four groups: firm characteristics, employment structure, firm strategies, and finance. For 
each of them, we discuss the results.   
    Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show the results of productivity and mark-up regressions 
respectively. They reveal that effects of firm characteristics are not always identical 
across industries and between productivity and market power. Firm ages have positive 
coefficients on productivity except for automobile retailers while generally negative on 
market power except for miscellaneous retailers. This finding is possibly interpreted as follows. Long-survived firms reach the higher productivity levels while lose their 
price-making power because their services are standardised. On the contrary, 
profitability and efficiency of business usually have negative coefficients on 
productivity while positive on market power. It implies that firms pursue profit 
maximisation thought obtaining price-making power rather than raising productivity. 
The sales-cashflow ratio is positively correlated with productivity while not correlated 
with market power. It says that soundness of management is positively correlated with 
productivity levels as expected. 
    As for employment structures, relying on part-time workers is not helpful for 
achieving higher productivity and market power. It means that greater use of part-time 
workers is not desirable for firms to achieve better performances although they rely on 
those workers to suppress costs. On the other hand, labour quality has positive 
coefficients on both productivity and market power. Therefore, enhancing labour quality 
is desirable for firms as we expect. This issue might be related to those of management 
practice.  
    Among firm strategy variables, none of these is strongly correlated with their 
productivity. Therefore, it is difficult to detect desirable directions of industrial policies 
to support productivity growth from these results. As for market power, the index of 
information use is positively correlated with market power while the market saturation 
strategy is negatively correlated. It means that the use of information is important for 
firms’ price-making power. On the other hand, firms which take the market saturation 
strategy do not pursue their business objective though price-making power. For firms’ 
finance, the ratio of self capital is not significantly estimated for a majority of 
regressions.  In addition to them, we examine FOREIGNK and OUTSOURCE based on a 
descriptive analysis. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 are diagrams of kernel density for productivity 
and market power with respect to FOREIGNK. In these diagrams, firms are classified 
into FOREIGNK if foreign capital accounts for over a third of their total capital. 
According to these figures, productivity levels of foreign firms are more diversified 
toward both the lower and higher sides than those of domestic firms. It indicates that we 
can not detect the composition effects of foreign firms on aggregate productivity in the 
retail trade industry. On the other hand, market powers of foreign firms are obviously 
higher than those of domestic ones. It implies that these larger market powers of foreign 
firms possibly yield the result that foreign firms have higher productivity than domestic 
one in preceding papers. It also indicates that the effects of globalisation on productivity 
should also be examined.   
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 are the same diagrams with respect to OUTSOURCE. In these 
diagrams, firms are classified into firms with outsourcing if their values of 
OUTSOURCE is positive. If not, they are firms with in-house production. The figures 
obviously show that productivity levels of firms with outsourcing are higher than firms 
with in-house production while their market powers are almost same. It indicates that 
outsourcing is strongly associated with higher productivity in this industry.   
In devising industrial policy to support productivity growth, we have to keep in 
mind that firms are unlikely to accept the policies which lower their market powers 
because they are thought to pursue profit maximisation through raising them. On the 
other hand, competition – friendly policies often support productivity growth through 
lowering them. Ignoring this gap possibly yields unsuccessful results. To briefly discuss 
this issue, we count how many regressors satisfy the condition which the firm side can accept. In Table 2-3, the second column (+, +) shows it. The third column (+, -)  
reveals the number of regressors which are favourable for productivity growth but not 
for market power. The fourth and fifth column are corresponding to the conditions 
which neither a policy maker nor a firm accepts. This table indicates that the policies 
which are acceptable for the firm side are relatively limited. 
  
5.  Concluding Results 
In this paper, we estimate firm-specific mark-up and productivity using a newly 
developed econometric method, and examine their dispersion. From our results, we 
obtain the following findings and implications. First, the estimates of productivity 
relying on some unrealistic assumption such as constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition are possibly biased. Therefore, implications based on those estimates are 
controversial, and alternative approaches to relax such assumptions are useful for 
looking for robust implications, comparing them from the standard one. Secondly, the 
relationships between market power and productivity are somewhat complicated. The 
firms with lower market power are less productive. On the other hand, firms with higher 
market power do not always have higher productivity. These market and competition 
structures are possibly influential for effectiveness of some competition-friendly 
policies. Examining why firms with lower productivity can have higher market powers 
will give further implications for desirable policies. Thirdly the transition matrices 
reveal that the retail trade industry is not Schumpeterian-innovative. The cause of the 
persistency of relative productivity and market power should also be examined, such as 
consumers’ behaviour or regulations. Fourthly, relative dynamics of productivity and 
market power are heterogeneous across groups of firms. Among them, food retail traders obtain lower productivity as well as lower market power. It means that their 
discounting battles do not result in and from productivity growth, and may deteriorate 
aggregate performance since they have the largest share in this industry. Therefore, 
policies focusing on this war of attrition possibly improve aggregate performance of this 
industry. And finally, productivity and market power have heterogeneous correlations 
with various regressors. It implies that some competition–friendly policies to support 
productivity growth may not be acceptable for firms. As a whole, our research indicates 
that the demand side analysis is also important even in analysis of productivity growth. 
    Our research still leaves some questions unanswered such as the effects of 
regulations and the role of ICTs because of data constraints. Those questions should be 
examined in future research. In addition, we need to expand this research to other 


















 Appendix 1: Examined Variables 
Var Name Note
SCALE log of total sales: business scale
LABOUR log of total workers: firm scale
AGE log of firm age: length of business continued
PROFIT ordinary profit / total sales: profitability
CASHFLOW (ordinary profit × 0.6 + depreciation) / total sales: estimated sales-cashflow ratio
EFFICIENT total sales/ fixed capital: efficiency of business
FOREIGNK ratio of Foreign Capital
OUTSOURCE outsourcing / total sales: ratio of outsourcing
PART part-time workers / total workers: ratio of par-time workers
WAGE total wages / total workers: average quality of workers
DIFFERENT (R&D + advertisement costs) / total sales: index of service differentiation 
INFO information cost / total sales: index of information use
DIVERGE index of diversification
























































 Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of Data 
Retail Cloth Food Auto Furn
32908 3741 8229 9079 923
Max 2505500 1097502 2505500 436728 229664
Min 80 595 80 613 431
Ave 20657 37488 29426 13326 17407
Med 6971 9805 7495 8136 5408
Var 73480 96098 120293 20581 31224
Skew 16.1867 5.9211 12.4970 9.0698 3.3548
Share 1.0000 0.2063 0.3562 0.1780 0.0236
Max 116721 31177 116721 5011 11110
M i n 5 05 05 05 05 0
Ave 658 892 1277 294 591
Med 224 338 374 198 180
Var 2375 1849 4373 349 1208
Skew 20.5107 5.8624 12.4408 5.2097 4.6669
Furniture Electric Drug Fuel Miscellaneous
923 1519 1365 3268 4783
Max 229664 1264235 301710 351647 280046
Min 431 454 105 635 276
Ave 17407 29937 13759 10580 12841.2
Med 5408 5890 5529 5125 5060
Var 31224 82651 27177 22817 25789.1
Skew 3.3548 7.0104 5.6900 8.2151 5.1274
Share 0.0236 0.0669 0.0276 0.0509 0.0904
Max 11110 11774 10653 5504 16527
M i n 5 05 05 05 05 0
Ave 591 481 550 226 495.3
Med 180 167 237 137 194
Var 1208 920 1048 328 973.8
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 Table 1-1: Transition Matrix of Productivity in the 1990s 
1990s 20 40 60 80 100 exit
20 0.5748 0.1413 0.0348 0.0131 0.0077 0.2283
40 0.1491 0.4458 0.1432 0.0222 0.0040 0.2357
60 0.0425 0.1664 0.4353 0.1313 0.0104 0.2142
80 0.0153 0.0272 0.1522 0.4936 0.0766 0.2352
100 0.0047 0.0044 0.0174 0.0936 0.6128 0.2670





Table 1-2: Transition Matrix of Productivity in the 2000s 
2000s 20 40 60 80 100 exit
20 0.6255 0.1426 0.0288 0.0117 0.0037 0.1877
40 0.1517 0.4859 0.1359 0.0259 0.0073 0.1933
60 0.0336 0.1569 0.4783 0.1121 0.0141 0.2049
80 0.0093 0.0257 0.1462 0.5221 0.0807 0.2159
100 0.0024 0.0047 0.0149 0.1034 0.6383 0.2364





Table 1-3: Transition Matrix of Market Power in the 1990s 
 
1990s 20 40 60 80 100 exit
20 0.5662 0.1017 0.0097 0.0023 0.0007 0.3194
40 0.0781 0.5138 0.1232 0.0124 0.0007 0.2722
60 0.0051 0.1057 0.5122 0.1288 0.0084 0.2395
80 0.0014 0.0115 0.1172 0.5721 0.0867 0.2112
100 0.0003 0.0004 0.0041 0.0803 0.7769 0.1381





Table 1-4: Transition Matrix of Market Power in the 2000s 
 
2000s 20 40 60 80 100 exit
20 0.5940 0.0960 0.0123 0.0013 0.0003 0.2960
40 0.0897 0.5310 0.1243 0.0143 0.0020 0.2387
60 0.0053 0.1063 0.5467 0.1323 0.0043 0.2050
80 0.0010 0.0123 0.1150 0.6074 0.0886 0.1756
100 0.0007 0.0003 0.0036 0.0767 0.7956 0.1230




 Table 2-1: Results of Productivity Regressions 
TFP
Coeff Retail Cloth Food AutomobileFurniture Electric Pharmacy Fuel Miscellaneous
SCALE 0.019*** -0.022** 0.027* 0.065*** -0.014 0.012*** 0.015 0.064 0.018***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.021) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.018)
LABOUR -0.048*** 0.019*** -0.055*** -0.064*** -0.055** -0.014** -0.063 -0.042 -0.006***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.012) (0.026) (0.008) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.018)
AGE 0.019*** 0.015** 0.023* -0.015*** 0.009 0.033 -0.006 0.013*** 0.001*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012)
PROFIT -0.486*** -0.063** -0.580 0.092 -0.249** -1.046 -0.806 -1.041*** -0.419***
(0.072) (0.122) (0.263) (0.618) (0.152) (0.204) (0.341) (0.212) (0.522)
CASHFLOW 1.603*** 1.008*** 2.351*** 1.102*** 1.049*** 2.340 1.962** 2.624*** 1.928***
(0.106) (0.166) (0.437) (0.869) (0.203) (0.263) (0.511) (0.329) (0.803)
EFFICIENT -0.001***-0.002***-0.006*** -0.006*** 0.000*** -0.001***-0.008***-0.002*** -0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
PART -0.045*** -0.074 0.008 -0.101*** -0.015 -0.003** -0.008** -0.050 -0.075***
(0.006) (0.022) (0.019) (0.046) (0.011) (0.014) (0.035) (0.016) (0.030)
WAGE 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.081*** -0.023*** 0.094*** 0.084 0.129** 0.069*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.028) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) (0.011) (0.017)
DIFFERENT 0.141** -0.681 0.091 -0.102*** 0.074** 0.533 0.580 0.491 0.209***
(0.071) (0.191) (0.150) (0.544) (0.226) (0.386) (0.263) (0.173) (0.169)
INFO -0.13 0.163 -0.108 -0.376 0.017 0.670 0.153 -0.085 -0.628
(0.140) (0.443) (0.364) (0.438) (0.492) (0.459) (0.858) (0.295) (0.650)
DIVERGE 0.019*** 0.028 0.004 0.030*** 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.003
(0.005) (0.010) (0.016) (0.031) (0.011) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.020)
ESTABLISH 0.004 0.002* -0.024 -0.015 0.008 0.003 -0.009 -0.016 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.028) (0.008) (0.008) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
SELFK 0.003 -0.004 0.005*** 0.052 0.029** 0.005** 0.047 -0.016 0.019*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.015)
Constant -1.092***-1.089***-1.099*** 0.263*** -0.937*** -1.251 -1.564** -1.283*** -0.589***
(0.056) (0.082) (0.184) (0.415) (0.124) (0.154) (0.400) (0.170) (0.250)
 
Note: ***, **, * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 










 Table 2-2: Results of Mark-up Regressions 
Markup
Coeff Retail Cloth Food AutomobileFurniture Electric Pharmacy Fuel Miscellaneous
SCALE -0.054***-0.035***-0.046*** -0.063*** -0.070***-0.048***-0.067***-0.055*** -0.084***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
LABOUR 0.002*** -0.017** -0.004*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.001*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.035
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
AGE -0.005***-0.003***-0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006 -0.005*** -0.002** -0.003*** 0.005**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
PROFIT 0.225*** 0.209*** 0.281*** 0.499*** 0.159*** 0.048*** 0.251 0.218 0.194***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.051) (0.100) (0.029) (0.048) (0.074) (0.044) (0.116)
CASHFLOW 0.051** 0.029 0.020 -0.244 0.049 0.373* 0.13 0.043*** 0.185
(0.021) (0.034) (0.084) (0.143) (0.039) (.059) (0.112) (0.068) (0.179)
EFFICIENT 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PART -0.004*** 0.005 -0.001*** 0.010 -0.009 -0.002 0.000*** -0.006 -0.038*
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
WAGE 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.047***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
DIFFERENT 0.029** -0.058 0.024 -0.004 -0.040 -0.067 -0.079 0.051 0.053
(0.013) (0.039) (0.025) (0.071) (0.039) (0.098) (0.052) (0.032) (0.038)
INFO 0.163*** -0.281 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.312** 0.383** 0.388** 0.138*** 0.301**
(0.029) (0.094) (0.072) (0.070) (0.101) (0.117) (0.193) (0.064) (0.142)
DIVERGE -0.001 0.002** -0.008 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
ESTABLISH-0.004*** 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.018 -0.006 -0.001*** -0.003 -0.007 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
SELFK 0.002*** 0.003 -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.000** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant 1.165*** 1.199*** 1.154*** 1.090*** 1.039*** 1.151*** 0.738*** 1.081*** 0.955***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.035) (0.063) (0.024) (0.037) (0.081) (0.034) (0.056)
 
Note: ***, **, * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 










 Table 2-3: Relations of Coefficients between Productivity and Market Power 
              
Industry +,  +  +,  －  －, +  －,  － 
Retail  4 4 4 1 
Cloth  4 3 4 2 
Food  3 5 4 1 
Automobile  3 2 5 3 
Furniture  6 3 2 2 
Electric  4 5 2 2 
Pharmacy  3 4 4 2 
Fuel  3 3 5 2 
Miscellaneous  7 1 4 1 
      
Note: +, + means positive coefficients on productivity and mark-up  
+,  －  means positive coefficients on productivity and negative on mark-up 
－, +    means negative coefficients on productivity and positive on mark-up 
－,  －  means negative coefficients on productivity and mark-up 
 









 Figure 1-1: Kernel Density of Estimated Productivities 
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 Figure 1-2: Scatter Diagram of Productivity Estimates by the Conventional and the   
Current Approaches 
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 Figure 2-1: Relation between TFP and Markup in Retail Trade Industry 
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Figure 2-2: Relation between TFP and Markup in Various Retail Trade Industries 1 
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 Figure 2-3: Relation between TFP and Markup in Various Retail Trade Industries 2 





TFP  Markup 







TFP  Markup 






TFP  Markup 









































  Note: Omega denotes relative levels of productivity 
 









































































MiscellaneousFigure 4-1: Kernel Density of Domestic and Foreign Firms for Productivity 
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    P  (TFP_D  =  TFP_F)  =0.2257  
 
Figure 4-2: Kernel Density of Domestic and Foreign Firms for Market Power 
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    P  (Mu_D  =  Mu_F)  =0.0140  
Figure 4-3: Kernel Density of In-house and Outsourcing Firms for Productivity 
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Figure 4-4: Kernel Density of In-house and Outsourcing Firms for Market Power 
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    P  (Mu_O  =  Mu_I)  =0.0000 